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Abstract 
 
Understanding the complementor behavior and 
its implication is the key to understanding platform 
dynamics. By using theoretical guides of 
organizational ecology, this study analyzed 
complementor's various niche strategies and their 
implications. Using the data from game industry, our 
study shows that the initial entry strategy to increase 
the survival rate is to concentrate on a specific game 
genre. However, as the platform grows, the 
relationship between complementor platform niche 
width and the survival rate shows inverted-U shape. 
From the perspective of the platform owner, it would 
be very difficult to provide various kinds of services 
especially at the early stage of developing the 
platform if all the complementors become genre-
specific. If many complementors choose to provide 
services to multiple platforms, it would be very 
difficult for the platform owner to provide services 
different from other platforms. We provide 
interpretations on various strategic implications of 
complementor dynamics to the platform strategy. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Platform is emerging as the core part of value 
chains in technology industries, which generates the 
value through connecting complementor's effort with 
the needs of the users [1, 2]. Due to its ability to 
facilitate active interaction among entities, platform 
is widely used in various fields [3] and becoming a 
dominant business model, especially in the software 
industry [4]. Platform consists of end users, 
complementors, and platform owners [1, 5-8]. 
Different participants join a platform and they each 
play unique role, which may be opened or closed 
depending on the structure of the platform [5, 8-10]. 
Among these actors, this research paper specifically 
focuses on the complementors and how the platform 
dynamics impact their strategic behavior. 
While traditional business model involves 
upstream suppliers and downstream buyers, the most 
distinct feature of the platform is the emergence of 
network effect. Network effect implies that the 
introduction of new users in the network causes 
growth of an existing market [11, 12]. The network 
effect in the platform can be subdivided into direct 
and indirect network effect. Direct network effect 
implies as the number of the platform users increases, 
the value of the platform increases as well, resulting 
in the attraction of more users [11]. On the other hand, 
indirect network effect exerts influence on the 
complementors. Increased number of users in the 
platform promotes the growth of the platform. This 
motivates complementors to make platform-specific 
investment by developing service and deciding to 
join the platform [13].  
Although existing studies have provided deep 
insights into various strategies of platform owners to 
facilitate network effect and platform growth, limited 
attention has been paid to understand the strategy and 
motivation of complementors. Some scholars 
observed the effect of complementors or users joining 
multiple platforms which is known as multi-homing 
[14-18]. However, studies were performed with 
viewpoint of owners and do not include the effect of 
platform growth on complementors and their 
strategic behaviors. Without their willingness to 
make investment to the application development of a 
platform, the platform is unable to attract users [9]. 
Hence, it is important to understand the strategic 
behavior of the complementors who act as providers 
of services in a platform. Throughout the paper, we 
attempt to offer the interpretation behind strategic 
actions of complementors with the theories from 
organizational ecology (OE). Building on 
organizational ecology theory, we investigate the 
strategies adopted by the complementors during the 
entry to the platform and growth of the platform. 
Furthermore, we analyze the effects of different 
strategies of the complementors on the platform in 
game industry.  
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To sum up, this research investigates the strategic 
behavior of complementors by focusing on two major 
research questions: (1) How does platform’s creation 
and growth affect the complementors? (2) What 
strategies do the complementors implement for their 
survival and growth, and how do they affect platform 
in turn? By providing answers to these research 
questions, this study contributes to literature of 
platform in several ways. First, we observe the effect 
of platform growth on complementors and attempt to 
extend previous research by providing explanation 
for dynamics of complementors using the density 
dependence theory of organizational ecology. Second, 
we consider strategies of complementors when they 
are participating in multi-platforms. Third, we 
examine various strategies executed by 
complementors and their effects on the platforms in 
two different situations: when the complementors are 
entering to the platform and when the platform is 
expanding.  
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis 
 
2.1. Organizational ecology in platform 
 
Theory of OE provides a useful tool to apprehend 
organizational diversity and dynamics by revealing 
effects of exogenous organizational factors and 
endogenous organizational factors on the founding, 
growth, and failure of organization [19]. Exogenous 
factors include social resources, political power, and 
technological innovation that are not under the 
control of the organization [20]. On the contrary, the 
endogenous factors that cause the dynamics of 
population and the interactions of organization are 
the population density, age, size of organization, 
niche width, and location [21-24]. As follows, 
research in OE considers both exogenous and 
endogenous factors as the causes of the various 
changes to the organization. Furthermore, as a 
prevalent framework for understanding the 
organization as an outcome of competition and 
selection processes, OE emphasizes the acquisition of 
niche. A niche refers to the segment in the market 
defined by the resources required for organizational 
survival [25, 26]. Depending on the size of niche, 
organization can be categorized into specialists and 
generalists [25]. As the resource becomes scarce in 
the environment, competition progressively 
intensifies, interfering the founding and evolution of 
organizations [25, 27, 28].  
In this paper, we attempt to view platform with 
the theoretical lens of OE. In the platform, platform 
owners and complementors are considered as having 
separate populations. Interaction between them 
results in the growth of platforms by promoting 
network effect. Expansion of the platform implies 
more opportunity is provided for the complementors 
to make a sale, but it also means that new 
complementors are introduced to the platform, 
increasing the competition level. According to OE, 
organizations compete within a physically limited 
area also known as a region [29]. Likewise, 
complementor is able to provide their services only 
through the platform, therefore, in other words, 
complementors operate within the boundary of the 
platform. However, this boundary is not a closed 
boundary. Rather, it can be considered as an open 
boundary because it allows complementors to join or 
leave to different platform, which is one of the 
strategies complementors employ for their growth 
and survival. Thus, in a platform, complementors are 
able to freely select and migrate to different 
platforms or even join multiple platform at a time, 
providing services to users.  
 
 
2.2. Network effect & density dependency in 
platform 
 
In the platform, although network effect acts 
favorably for platform owners by attracting more 
users and complementors, from the perspective of the 
complementor, increased number of complementors 
by the network effect can influence them negatively 
through the density effect. As the platform expand, 
not only new users join the platform but 
complementors participate into the platform. As the 
number of complementors increases, it creates 
competitive situation for the complementors, 
threatening the survival of the complementors. 
Specifically, density dependence theory argues that 
the change in population density leads to the process 
of organization’s legitimation and competition [30].  
The concept of localized competition in OE 
distinguishes competition into two types: 
organizations within the entire population and 
competition among organizations that are locally 
close [29]. First, when the concept of organizational 
competition within the entire population is applied to 
the complementors, complementors do not 
necessarily have to go through the process of 
legitimation. In the early days of the market, the 
social legitimacy of the market is fairly weak, thus it 
is not viewed as an attractive for the complementor to 
invest in due to the difficulty in the resources 
acquisition. However, platform owners promote the 
participation of new users to the market, which 
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enhances the network effect and increases the value 
of the market [11]. Increased value leads to the 
expansion of the market where complementor can 
provide services, thereby enhancing the legitimacy. 
Thus, once the platform owner population develops 
legitimacy, it facilitates the participation of new 
complementors into the platform. By participating in 
to the market where legitimacy is already developed, 
complementors can omit the process of legitimacy 
but experiences the process of competition right away 
as the density increases. If the process of legitimation 
was necessary for the complementors, the mortality 
rate should decrease as density increases until the 
process of competition begins. Thus, a positive 
relationship between population density of 
complementors and their organizational mortality 
should be observed right away. 
 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between 
population density of complementors and their 
organizational mortality.  
 
It is also important to examine the competition of 
complementors within a platform, which can be 
perceived as a localized competition among 
organizations that are locally close [29]. Although 
there is competition among organizations within the 
entire population, severe competition is also observed 
within the platform. The boundary of the platform is 
an open boundary which allows complementors to 
move freely from the one platform to another 
according to their strategic decisions. This causes 
constant changes in the density of complementors in 
a platform. Thus, due to the unique feature of the 
platforms, not only the population density is 
important but also the density of the complementors 
in the platform needs to be taken into account. 
Similarly, complementors do not have to experience 
the process of legitimation because the formation of 
the platform implies that legitimacy already exists. 
The legitimacy of platform is directly transferred to 
complementors, exposing to the competition effect 
from early on. As density of complementors in 
platform continues to increase, competition among 
complementors intensifies, which results in higher 
mortality rate. Therefore, we made the following 
assumptions regarding the effect of complementor 
density in platform. 
 
H1b: There is a positive relationship between density 
and mortality of complementors within platform.  
 
2.3. Complementor’s niche strategy in 
platform 
 
Niche is a resource for organization’s survival and 
growth, and it can also be perceived as a range of its 
activities [21], thus complementors must secure niche. 
Depending on the degree of width, organization can 
be classified in to a generalist (wide niche) or a 
specialist (narrow niche). Niche is not only a physical 
resource required for an organization to survive, but 
it is also associated with an identity, an perception 
that external audience have regards the organization 
[31, 32]. Furthermore, a platform NW strategy, is 
also associated with multi-homing in platform studies. 
Complementor adopting multi-homing strategy 
would reduce differentiation between platforms [17, 
33]. While most of multi-homing studies discuss the 
effects of multi-homing on the platform [15, 16, 18], 
few studies are related to the the advantages 
complemetors gained by implementing the multi-
homing strategy [34-36].  
If the behavior of the organization is aligned with 
its identity, their value will be recognized by 
customers, but customers will devalue the 
organization if the behavior and identity are not 
coordinated [31, 37]. For instance, an organization 
with simple identity has the advantage of allowing 
customers to easily recognize and classify the 
organization. However, the simple identity constrains 
the organization to pursue various strategic actions 
[38]. On the other hand, organizations with 
complicated identities are not subject to specific 
categories, thus less constrained by organizational 
behavior. However, this makes it difficult for 
customers to recognize and specify their identities 
[39]. As such, niche can be perceived as the both a 
necessary resource as well as the identity 
To quickly obtain network effect and secure user 
base, in terms of niche, there are two strategic 
choices that complementors need to decide: platform 
niche width (platform range) and genre niche width 
(service range) First, platform niche width (NW) 
refers to the platform scope of the complementors. 
While organizations compete in a regionally limited 
and fixed area, complementors can decide to join a 
single or multiple platforms freely according their 
strategy. Depending on whether complementors 
execute strategy of generalist or specialist, there are 
different advantages and disadvantages in terms of 
customer base and platform technology optimization. 
If complementors decide to adopt generalist strategy 
and provides services across multiple platforms with 
wide platform NW, the organization is able to 
quickly increase the network effect through its broad 
customer base in multiple platforms [40]. Generalist 
strategy have advantage of distributing the risks 
associated with high development costs [34]. 
However, disadvantage of a generalist strategy 
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includes high development cost due to customization 
of the services according to the technical features of 
each platform, which may result in the low service 
quality. On the other hand, if complementors adopt 
the strategy of specialist by narrowing platform NW 
and providing service to a single platform, it is highly 
likely that a complementors are able to provide 
optimized services to the platform. But, because 
specialist strategy targets specific platform, 
complementors retain narrow customer base and is 
greatly influenced by that particular platform.  
Second decision that the complementor has to 
make is genre NW, customer base that 
complementors aim to satisfy through their services. 
Genre NW strongly affects the ‘identity’ that is 
formed amongst the audience. Audience views these 
organizational properties and builds expectation 
toward the organization. These expectations often 
constrain the activities of organization because 
observation made by the audience whether the 
organization violate or satisfy the codes impacts the 
audience’s social approval of an organization. If 
complementors adopt the wide genre NW of 
generalist, it can secure wide customer base by 
satisfying diverse preferences of users. In addition, 
complementors can flexibly respond to 
environmental changes, such as changes in the user 
taste. However, complicated identity of 
complementors makes it difficult for users to 
recognize the organization quickly [38, 39, 41]. On 
the other hand, the complementors, who choose the 
genre NW of specialist, has the advantage of 
organizational identity being promptly recognized by 
the user and quickly acquiring the customer base in a 
specific service area. However, when complementors 
with the identity as the specialist attempt to broaden 
the NW, users may devalue their action and feel 
resistance. Likewise, platform NW and genre NW 
strategies of generalist and specialist exhibit different 
advantages and disadvantages in terms of customer 
segment and identity. 
 
 
Figure 1. OE in Platform 
 
2.4. Entry strategy of complementor to a 
platform 
 
When participating in the platform,  
complementors select platform NW and genre NW 
strategy [42]. In the case of platform NW, it is 
beneficial for complementors to adopt generalist’s 
platform NW strategy. It allows them to serve 
multiple platforms and lower their mortality rate. 
Because the entry cost to platform is relatively low, 
participating to multiple platform is not difficult, 
allowing the benefit of acquiring greater number of 
users [42]. Although there are risks of not being able 
to develop high quality services due to the different 
platform’s technological environments, the wide 
platform NW reduces the risk of service failures by 
broadening the organizational activity to multiple 
platforms. By preventing the risk of the service 
failure, it lowers the dependency of complementors 
on a specific platform, thereby providing autonomy 
to the organizational activity. In addition, it is 
possible to enjoy economies of scale and scope by 
creating large-scale services based on a broad 
customer base. Therefore, we made the following 
assumption for platform NW of generalist and 
organizational mortality rate when complementors 
enter to the platform. 
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between entry 
platform NW and mortality of complementors. 
 
In reference to the complementors’ genre NW 
during the entry to the platform, complementors with 
narrow genre NW will have lower possibility of 
failure. Executing genre NW of specialist allows 
complementors to provide high quality and 
specialized services to users by focusing on a specific 
service genre. The strategy of service diversification 
eases the process of expanding service in the future, 
which implies to the high level of adaptability to 
external environmental changes [39]. However, in the 
early stage of the organization, factors such as 
immature organizational capacity and limited 
resources constrain the organizational activity [19]. 
Therefore, it is better for complementors to provide a 
high-quality and specialized service. Additionally, a 
strategy to focus organizational capabilities on a 
specific genre allows users to quickly recognize an 
organization as a specialist (Hsu & Hannan, 2005), 
which results in the securing users quickly with 
specialized service and promoting the network effect. 
Based on distinct identity and differentiated 
competitiveness during the early stage, the 
complementor is able to quickly attract users and 
lower the mortality rate of organization. Therefore, 
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we made the following assumption for genre NW of 
specialist strategy and organizational mortality rate 
when complementors enter the platform. 
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between entry 
genre NW and mortality of complementors. 
 
2.5. Complementors’ niche strategy in 
platform growth 
 
As the platform grows, complementors may alter 
strategy of platform NW and genre NW to survive in 
a competitive market. However, their strategies may 
differ from those adopted when entering to the 
platform. As competition becomes more intense 
within the platform, complementors adopt platform 
NW strategy of specialist or generalist and both of 
the strategy positively affect the organizational 
survival. If  complementors implement platform NW 
of specialist, it increases the survival rate by 
expanding users with specialized services that target 
the specific customer base [43]. It also enhances the 
expertise, thus increase the chance of organization's 
survival. Moreover, it provides a strong relationship 
with the platform owner that offers opportunity for 
complementors to secure additional resources and 
special attention. On the other hand, it is also 
beneficial for complementors to execute the 
generalist’s platform NW strategy. Participating into 
multiple platforms results in the market 
diversification [44]. Furthermore, it leads to the 
expansion of customer base, risk distribution, 
economies of scale, and lowers the organization's 
mortality rate. Therefore, implementing either one of 
the strategy will lower the mortality rate of the 
complementor. However, expanding services from a 
single platform to multiple platforms requires 
conversion of existing service because each platform 
is characterized by different technological features. 
This process requires additional investment for 
developing optimized services for each platform and 
maintenance cost. If complementors lack capability 
and resources, the process of adopting a generalist 
strategy would increase the mortality rate. But the 
process of continuously broadening platform NW 
facilitates accumulation of knowledge regarding 
technology and service maintenance and eventually 
enhances the organizational capability. Therefore, we 
made the following assumption for platform NW and 
organization mortality rate in the competitive 
environment. 
 
H4: There is an inverted-U relationship between a 
platform NW and mortality of a complementor. 
 
Second, complementors can similarly change 
genre NW as the platform grows by implementing 
either one of specialist or generalist’s strategy. If a 
complementors adopt strategy of specialist with 
narrow genre NW, it increases organizational 
capabilities for that genre and lower the rate of 
organizational mortality. But, as competition 
intensifies, complementors attempt to increase 
organizational viability through broadening genre 
NW. A strategy that meets various needs of users 
through a wide range of genres can provide new 
value to existing users and attract new users who are 
not satisfied with current services. Especially, it can 
reduce the risk that is associated with the evaporation 
of demand within the specific genre. However, if 
complementors has imprinted their identity as 
specialist to users, users may feel reluctant to 
complementors, broadening genre NW and 
modifying the identity, [45]. Also, the expansion of 
genre NW from narrow to wide requires new 
organizational capabilities and additional resources to 
develop services in new genres. Nonetheless, in long 
term, the strategy of expanding genre NW widens 
scope of organizational activities, thus reduces the 
organization's mortality rate. Once complementors 
develop capability to create high quality games in 
different genres and establish identities as a generalist, 
this can be extremely beneficial. Therefore, we made 
the following assumption for genre NW and 
organization mortality rate in competitive 
environment. 
 
H5: There is an inverted-U relationship between a 
genre NW and mortality of a complementor. 
 
3. Research and method 
 
The game industry can be perceived as a typical 
platform industry composed of a game console 
company as a platform owner, game developer as a 
complementor, and game players as users. The data 
was collected from 1977 to 2014, which is a 
sufficient period to observe the founding and failure 
of complementors. 
 
3.1. Data 
 
We targeted video game developers from 1977 to 
2014 in order to analyze the strategic behaviors of the 
complementors. We collected data regarding the 
game company history and game titles released by 
game developers. Then collected data was cross-
validated with video game open sites such as 
"Mobygames.com", "Vgchartz.com", and Wikipedia. 
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The final data includes 1,737 game developers, 
excluding the companies that do not have company 
history information and released game information. 
 
3.2. Variable 
 
3.2.1. Mortality event 
 
The reasons for game developer failure can 
vary, but mainly they can be classified into three 
categories: 1) disbanding of the firm; 2) exit to 
another industry; and 3) merger or acquisition by 
another firm. We categorized firms into two types: 1) 
disbanding of the firm if firm is recorded by 
bankruptcy or close and 2) exit to another industry in 
our data but there aren’t cases of type 2. Also, we did 
not included third types because it was difficult to 
decide whether the merger was due to success or 
failure of the firm’s game. 
 
3.2.2. Population variable 
 
Population Density: It is defined as the number of 
organizations in the game developer population in 
each year. Founding point of organization is 
measured as January of the year, and failure point of 
organization is measured as December of year. 
Platform Density: It represents a number of 
complementors within a platform which 
complementor participate in. If a complementor is 
participating in multiple platforms, we sum densities 
of complementors in each platforms. Finally we 
calculate the platform density by adding weight 
which refers to a number of platform that 
complementor participate in.  
 
D : The number of complementors participated in 
platform i each year.  
 : The portion of density of platform i out of 
sum of density from all platform each year. 
 : Whether the complementor j releases game 
title in platform i each year or not.  
 
3.2.3. Organizational variable 
 
Age: The time from creation of the organization 
to the time of the death is measured. 
Size: The size of the organization can be 
measured in various ways such as the sales of the 
organization or the number of employees. However, 
the organization size is relatively small in the game 
platforms, resembling the venture company. Thus, 
the number of game titles is employed to measure the 
size of organization. 
Organization Niche Width: platform niche refers 
to the scope where the game developers aims to 
release the game, while genre niche represents the 
genre scope of game. In this paper, we categorize 34 
game platforms, including game consoles and mobile 
game platforms developed by game platform 
manufactures. Game genres are categorized into eight 
genres: action, adventure, education, racing, role 
playing, simulation, and sports. Platform NW and 
genre NW in the game industry can be understood in 
terms of concentration of game developer on the 
platform and on the genre when launching the game. 
For example, if the games are released to multiple 
platforms, the platform NW is perceived as less 
concentrated. Also, if the complementor develops 
several genres of games, the genre NW is described 
as less focused. We use HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index) to measure concentration on platform and 
genre [46]. The HHI is a measurement of the 
concentration in the industry and is suitable for 
measuring platform concentration and genre 
concentration. However, the lower the concentration 
of HHI, that is, the more convergent to 0, the larger 
the Niche. Therefore, for the sake of cognitive 
convenience, the HHI value was inversely 
transformed so that the HHI value increases as the 
Niche width increases. 
 
Genre Niche Width: 1/HHI (N: Number of Genre 
each year,  : Portion of Genre j in Released Game 
each year ) 
Platform Niche Width: 1/HHI (N: Number of 
Platform by year, : Portion of Platform j in 
Released Game each year ) 
Platform Entry Strategy: We measured platform 
NW and Genre NW for three years after the game 
developers participate in the game platform and 
launched games for the first time. According to the 
ESA data in 2013, the average period of game 
development is 1.6 years. Hence, the period of three 
years is sufficient time to observe the initial platform 
entry strategy. 
Niche Width Strategy: We measured the Platform 
NW and Genre NW for three years. The three-year 
period was decided considering the average game 
development period of 1.6 years. 
 
Page 4979
 3.2.4. Environment variable 
 
Market Size: Changes in the size of the game 
market affect the growth of the platform, thus we 
reflect the revenue of the game industry as a variable. 
Recession: Economic downturn is considered as 
an external factor and it is treated as a dummy 
variable. 
Industry Event: In order to reflect the 
characteristics of the game industry, the bankruptcy 
timing of game industry due to low quality game 
from 1983 to 1985 is included. 
Technology Change: In the case of video consoles, 
due to the technological innovation, the game 
platform manufacture introduces new game console 
periodically. Research model reflects the timing of 
technology changes as dummy variables since they 
have a great impact on the platform industry. 
Platform Dummy: Each platform has different 
business policy and technological characteristics. We 
included characteristics of 31 platform to model as 
dummy variable. 
Genre Dummy: We categorized game title into 
8 types (action, adventure, education, racing, role-
playing, simulation, sports, and strategy) which is 
based on “mobygames.com” and “Vgchartz.com”. 
We reflected genre to model as dummy variable. 
 
3.2.5. Model specification and estimation 
 
We use a piecewise constant exponential model in 
history analysis that does not assume any specific 
pattern between age and mortality. A piecewise 
constant exponential model divides organizational 
age into several periods, and then calculates the 
relationship between organizational age and mortality 
rate within each period. In this case, the mortality rate 
in each period has the maximum value allowed by the 
data without any assumption, and has the same 
mortality rate within each period. The total duration 
of the organizational age is divided into section 
 and is divided into P 
sections with the assumption of . The 
interval setting is divided into seven intervals 0 2921 
5112 6573 9130 9860 10226 through several 
measurements with reference to the life table. 
Therefore, the mortality rate of the organization in 
the individual section is expressed 
as . Here,  is the mortality 
rate of the organization  in the interval p, and  is 
the baseline hazard of the interval p.  is the 
covariate variable that affects the mortality rate of the 
organization. In this paper, market size, recession, 
industry event, and technology change are included 
as external variables and organization size is included 
as an intrinsic variable of the organization.  
 
4. Finding 
 
To test our hypotheses, we use the piecewise 
constant exponential model. In each model, market 
size, recession, industry event, technology change 
and effect of age are included. Model 1 includes only 
population density and platform density and in model 
2, we add the entry NW. For model 3, current NW 
such as platform NW and genre NW are incorporated. 
Finally, model 4 provides the full model with all 
controls and independent variables.  
 
Table 1. Complementor’s survival analysis 
Label Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Firm’s Size 
Market Size 
Recession 
Industry Event 
Tech. Change 
Population Density 
Platform Density 
Entry Platform NW 
Entry Genre NW 
Current Platform NW 
Current Platform NW 
0 
400 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
200 
76000 
1 
1 
1 
2162 
21994 
7.758 
4.571 
7.758 
4.898 
1.36 
46504 
0.249 
0.014 
0.329 
1652.0 
1148.2 
0.81 
0.659 
1.292 
1.115 
4.467 
18515 
0.433 
0.119 
0.47 
599.76 
1819.2 
1.183 
1.003 
1.042 
0.781 
 
 
To investigate the effects of environmental factors 
in game platform industry, we statistically analyze 
the effect of market size, recession, industry event 
and technology change. The results show that market 
size lowered the mortality rate of complementors by 
expanding market space and niche space where 
complementors can actively provide their services. 
Atari Shock, representing the industry period variant, 
has significant effect on the complementor’s 
mortality rate by providing of low-quality games to 
users and threating credibility of the game industry. 
In terms of technology change in the platform, game 
console manufactures periodically replace platform 
console due to the introduction of technological 
innovation to the game industry. This technological 
advance is perceived as an opportunity for 
complementors to provide new games based on 
platform's innovative technology, but it can also act 
as a threat for the organization if organization fails to 
adapt the technology.  
In H1a, we propose that there is a positive 
relationship between population density of 
complementors and their organizational mortality. In 
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Table 2, we note a positive coefficient for the 
population density of complementors and their 
organizational mortality (Model I: beta=0.874, p<.05), 
in support of H1a. Additionally, we test the positive 
effect of platform density of complementors on 
mortality of a complementor within a platform, in 
H1b. Because the results show that the coefficient is 
positive (Model I: beta=0.289, p<.001), they support 
H1b. 
 
 
Table 2. Complementor’s survival analysis 
 
*** P<0.001, ** P<0.01, * P<0.05, + P<0.1 estimated standard errors are in parentheses 
 
We propose that there is a negative relationship 
between entry platform NW and morality of a 
complementor in H2, but the result shows that H2 is 
not statistically significant. In the hypothesis, we 
assume that when complementors adopt generalist’s 
platform NW by providing services to multiple 
platforms, they are able to expand the customer base 
quickly, thereby increasing the likelihood of service 
success and lowering the mortality rate. However, 
statistic results reveal that generalist strategy did not 
positively impact the survival of the complementors. 
This result can be explained in terms of organizational 
capability. If complementors provide games to multiple 
platforms, it is necessary to convert the games 
according to specific technology of each platform. This 
requires organizational capability that enables the 
development of a game in multiple versions and 
achievement of the same quality level for each 
platform. However, right after the founding of the 
organization, complementors do not have sufficient 
organizational competence to do so, thus the strategy 
of broadening platform NW does not have significant 
impact on the complementor’s mortality rate. 
In the case of H3, we predict that entry genre NW 
would positively affect the mortality of a 
complementor and we note a positive coefficient for 
the entry NW and mortality of a complementor (Model 
II: beta=0.38, p<.001), supporting H3. Hence, focusing 
on specialized genres is beneficial for the organization 
survival.  
In H4, we predict that there is an inverted U-
relationship between a platform NW and mortality of a 
complementor. According to Table 2 platform NW 
related positively to mortality of a complementor 
Variable Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Organization 
 Age1 
 Age2 
 Age3 
 Age4 
 Age5 
 Age6 
 Age7 
 Size 
  
-17.689(2.448)*** 
-17.439(2.451)*** 
-17.314(2.457)*** 
-17.402(2.466)*** 
-17.43(2.521)*** 
-17.599(2.648)*** 
-17.302(2.493)*** 
-0.022(0.026) 
  
-18.257(2.46)*** 
-18.018(2.463)*** 
-17.919(2.471)*** 
-18.028(2.48)*** 
-18.088(2.536)*** 
-18.246(2.661)*** 
-17.966(2.508)*** 
-0.02(0.026) 
  
-19.758(2.529)*** 
-19.545(2.533)*** 
-19.451(2.541)*** 
-19.548(2.552)*** 
-19.615(2.607)*** 
-19.782(2.729)*** 
-19.477(2.579)*** 
-0.015(0.026) 
  
-19.72(2.531)*** 
-19.52(2.535)*** 
-19.443(2.543)*** 
-19.553(2.554)*** 
-19.64(2.609)*** 
-19.789(2.731)*** 
-19.502(2.581)*** 
-0.017(0.026) 
Environment 
 Market Size 
 Recession 
 Industry Event 
 Technology Change 
  
-0.00002(6e-06)*** 
0.354(0.156)* 
2.177(0.828)** 
-0.294(0.162)+ 
  
-0.00002(6e-06)*** 
0.356(0.156)* 
2.233(0.831)** 
-0.294(0.162)+ 
  
-0.00002(6e-06)*** 
0.354(0.156)* 
2.344(0.837)** 
-0.305(0.162)+ 
  
-0.00002(6e-06)*** 
0.355(0.156)* 
2.325(0.84)** 
-0.301(0.162)+ 
Population 
Population Density(log) 
 Platform Density(log) 
 Platform1~Platform31 
 Genere1 ~ Genre8 
  
0.874(0.36)* 
0.289(0.058)*** 
omitted 
omitted 
  
0.904(0.361)* 
0.238(0.061)*** 
omitted 
omitted 
  
1.142(0.365)** 
0.142(0.069)* 
omitted 
omitted 
  
1.024(0.365)** 
0.145(0.069)* 
omitted 
omitted 
Entry Niche Width 
 Platform NW 
 Genre NW 
    
0.093(0.086) 
0.38(0.11)*** 
  
  
  
  
-0.051(0.105) 
0.309(0.121)* 
 Current Niche Width 
 Platform NW 
 Platform NW^2 
 Genre NW 
 Genre NW^2 
      
1.013(0.306)*** 
-0.134(0.058)* 
0.691(0.515) 
-0.129(0.131) 
  
1.017(0.315)*** 
-0.13(0.058)* 
0.427(0.525) 
-0.098(0.131) 
Page 4981
(Model III: beta=1.013, p<.001), but the quadratic term 
exhibited a negative relationship (Model III: beta=-
0.134, p<.05). Therefore, a platform NW display a 
curvilinear relationship with mortality of a 
complementor, in support of H4. Lastly, we propose 
that there is an inverted-U relationship between genre 
NW and mortality of a complementor in H5. 
Statistically, H5 is not supported which may be due to 
the unique feature of the game industry. In the game 
industry, it seems that other factors such as the 
characters in the game greatly influence the 
development of identity. When the game is introduced 
for the first time to the users, there is no information 
regarding the complementor, so the users evaluate the 
organization based on the game genre. As the number 
of user increases, users tend to develop the identity of 
complementors based on the characters of the game, 
representing the game developer. Thus, the effect of 
genre on the development of identity becomes limited. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In this study, we observe the two aspects of 
network effect. First aspect has positive impacts by 
facilitating the growth of the platform, while second 
aspect involves negative effect on the complementors 
by increasing their mortality rate. In the platform 
environment, the complementor uses different 
strategies in a timely manner. When entering to a 
platform, by focusing on specific genres with a 
specialist’s narrow genre NW, the complementor 
allows quick recognition of the organizational identity 
by the users. On the other hand, when the platform is 
growing, complementors adapt one of either platform 
NW of a generalist or a specialist. Broadening platform 
NW expands customer base by providing services to 
multiple platforms while narrow platform NW offers 
the capability to provide optimized service to users in a 
specific platform.  
Through the statistical analyses, we confirm that 
the strategic behaviors of the complementor impact the 
entire platform in several ways. First, the competition 
among complementors resulted from the platform 
growth increases the mortality rate of complementors, 
which acts as an obstacle for the platform owner to 
continually provide new services. Hence, the platform 
owner needs to adopt strategy such as complementor 
management strategy and strategic alliance that enables 
platform to continuously attract new complementors 
into the platform and retain them. Second, in the early 
stage of the platform, although implementing 
specialist’s genre NW decreases the mortality rate, it 
also prevents platform owners to provide a variety of 
services to the users. As not being able to provide 
diversified services to the users, the ability of platform 
to attract new users and facilitate network effect is 
limited. Thus, the platform owner must prevent the 
situation of complementors’ services being biased 
toward a specific genre at the early phase of the 
platform.  
This study includes several limitations that need to 
be taken into account in interpreting the results. First, 
during the process of statistical analysis, we include the 
characteristic of platform as a dummy variable. 
Nonetheless, each platform possesses unique 
characteristic that represents the technological aspect 
of the platform and policy that influence the strategic 
decision of complementors. Second, this research 
examines the strategy of complementors in platforms 
during the entrance and growth. However, the platform 
itself also experiences the process of founding, 
expansion and obsolescence and these the platform 
lifecycle influences the strategic behaviors of the 
complementors. However, we did not incorporate 
lifecycle of platform. 
In sum, we investigate the strategic behaviors of 
complementors and their impacts on the platform. This 
paper provides theory and interpretations on various 
strategic behaviors of complementor. By understanding 
complementors’ strategic behaviors and their effects on 
the platform dynamics, we suggest that the platform 
owner needs to flexibly cope with the strategic changes 
of individual complementor. 
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